Summary of analysis of dossier from Mahyco et al. in support of their claims of safety of fruit and shoot borer tolerant brinjal by Heinemann, J.A.
Centre for Integrated Research 
in Biosafety 
Tel: +64 3 354 2500, Fax: + 64 364 2590 
Email: jack.heinemann@canterbury.ac.nz 
 
 
 
Summary of analysis of dossier from Mahyco et al. in support of their claims of safety of 
fruit and shoot borer tolerant brinjal 
 
Introduction 
I am submitting to the Philippines Government this opinion on the testing of Bt brinjal conducted 
in India because I understand that the Philippines is currently evaluating a Bt brinjal event for 
commercial release and is relying in whole or in part on the results of Indian testing.  
 
What follows is my opinion of the testing of the product known as Bt brinjal (EE-1 event) 
produced by a consortium of institutions including Mahyco of India. I have evaluated selected 
sections of the “Mahyco dossier”1 released for review in India in 2008 and a response to criticisms 
(ECII)2 of this data issued by the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee of India (in 2009). To 
my knowledge, there is no additional information that has been made available to the Philippines, 
and the dossier submitted for risk assessment contains the same data as that submitted to the Indian 
regulators; hence my comments are also relevant for the Philippines. 
 
Importantly, only one country—India—has formally considered the risk assessment of Bt brinjal 
and they have decided that there is insufficient evidence of its safety. The Indian regulator, GEAC, 
failed in its evaluation of the assessment data to convince its minister, the Honourable Jairam 
Ramesh, that Bt brinjal was safe either as food or for open cultivation (e.g., Table 1). 
Overwhelming evidence from the independent scientific community submitted to the Minister and 
to GEAC justified a Ministerial moratorium on the product until proper and customised testing can 
be completed. To my knowledge, results of tests that address the flaws carefully examined by the 
independent scientific community have not been provided to India and therefore the Philippines 
are unlikely to have received any information that has not already been considered and dismissed 
by India. 
 
                                                 
1 Mainly a document called Toxicology and allergenicity studies vol. 1. 
2 Report of the Expert Committee (EC-II) on Bt Brinjal Event EE-1 Developed by: M/s Maharashtra Hybrid 
Seeds Company Ltd. (Mahyco), Mumbai University of Agricultural Sciences (UAS), Dharwad and Tamil 
Nadu Agricultural University (TNAU), Coimbatore. Submitted to the Genetic Engineering Approval 
Committee of the Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests on October 8, 2009. 
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Who am I? 
I am a professor of genetics and molecular biology in the School of Biological Sciences at 
the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand and a senior adjunct professor of gene 
ecology at GenØk – Centre for Biosafety in Tromsø, Norway. I was previously a staff fellow at the 
US National Institutes of Health. My BSc with honors in biochemistry and molecular biology was 
from the University of Wisconsin – Madison and my PhD in molecular biology was conferred by 
the University of Oregon. I received the ICAAC Young Investigator Award from the American 
Society for Microbiology in 1993 and was the recipient of the New Zealand Association of 
Scientists Research Medal in 2002. I am listed by the United Nations as a biosafety expert and 
served on the 2009-2010 Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management established under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. I have published broadly in 
the peer-reviewed scientific literature, authored invited works for the Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the International Assessment of Agricultural 
Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD), advised various government 
agencies in several countries and have an active laboratory with four PhD students (with more on 
the way) and a postdoctoral scholar. 
 
Purpose 
Products of genetic engineering techniques, such as Bt brinjal, are by international consensus 
agreement subject to a risk assessment (Table 2). This consensus is reflected in the work of the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission (herein Codex) formed between the UN FAO and the World 
Health Organisation and which sets international standards for food safety, including for food 
derived from GMOs, and in the international agreement on the transboundary movement of living 
genetically modified organisms (LMOs/GMOs) called the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
 
There are inconsistencies in how regulators in different countries prioritise the assessment and in 
which aspects of the assessment they prioritise. It is both proper and appropriate for different 
countries to come to different conclusions about the evidence available to assess risk or conclude 
safety. This is because: 1. different regulators may require different kinds of tests relevant to food 
safety in their country due to different levels of consumption, manner of preparation, and attention 
to scientific details; and 2. testing of the GMO in the food and/or environment of the country being 
asked to accept it is not always done and thus the dossiers submitted by companies are not 
addressing fundamental and specific risks in each country receiving the application. Customized, 
country-relevant, case-by-case risk assessment requires data pertinent to and developed in the 
Philippines.
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Table 1: Selected standards allowed by Codex but enforced at discretion of GEAC. 
Codex recommendation Action Next Was the action 
requested? 
Molecular biological and 
biochemical techniques can 
also be used to analyse 
potential changes at the 
level of gene transcription 
and message translation 
that could lead to 
unintended effects.  
Profiling of the 
transcriptome and 
proteome (for novel RNA 
or protein molecules, or 
novel concentrations of 
normal RNA or protein 
molecules) for purposes of 
hazard identification. 
If changes unique to the 
GM plant are found, 
these unintended changes 
can be further assessed if 
necessary. 
No 
    
The sensitivity of all 
analytical methods should 
be documented.  
Proper reporting so that 
independent scientists 
could recreate the 
experiment and confirm 
the result. 
If reporting is 
insufficient for 
independent 
confirmation, require the 
necessary details before 
advancing approval. 
No 
    
The goal of each safety 
assessment is to provide 
assurance, in the light of the 
best available scientific 
knowledge, that the food 
does not cause harm when 
prepared, used and/or eaten 
according to its intended 
use.  
Feeding and 
compositional studies 
using both whole food and 
food processed or 
prepared as humans would 
eat it. 
If adverse effects are 
noted with the food in 
this form, then require 
further testing or reject 
on safety grounds. 
No 
    
[D]emonstrate whether 
deliberate modifications 
made to the amino acid 
sequence of the expressed 
protein result in changes in 
its post-translational 
modification or affect sites 
critical for its structure or 
function  
Isolate novel protein(s) 
from the plant and 
measure molecular mass 
using mass spectrometry. 
Determine if any 
isoforms have been 
modified in any way and 
test for toxicity or 
allergenicity. 
No 
    
[D]emonstrate whether the 
newly expressed trait(s) are 
expressed as expected in 
the appropriate tissues in a 
manner and at levels that 
are consistent with the 
associated regulatory 
sequences driving the 
expression of the 
corresponding gene  
Using targeted techniques 
for the isolation of in-
planta produced novel 
protein, measure 
concentration in a tissue 
and time of development 
study across multiple test 
sites and years. 
Evaluate implications of 
protein concentration for 
food (or environmental) 
risks. 
No 
    
[I]ndicate whether there is 
any evidence to suggest that 
one or several genes in the 
host plant has been affected 
by the transformation 
process  
Profiling of the 
transcriptome and 
proteome (for novel RNA 
or protein molecules, or 
novel concentrations of 
normal RNA or protein 
molecules) and the 
metabolome for purposes 
of hazard identification. 
If changes unique to the 
GM plant are found, 
these unexpected or 
unintended changes can 
be further assessed if 
necessary. 
No 
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I have compiled a list of issues that may be of relevance for the risk assessment process in the 
Philippines and to the ultimate decision maker. The Philippines will have its own consumption 
patterns and local cooking/processing practices that may be relevant to the emergence of an 
unintended adverse effect caused by eating Bt brinjal. Codex recommends that local patterns be 
taken into consideration and that the GM food be tested after cooking: “The potential effects of 
food processing, including home preparation, on foods derived from recombinant-DNA plants 
should also be considered” (paragraph 47). The Philippines has its own unique environment and 
therefore non-target animals, from insects to nematodes through to mammals and birds, that will 
be exposed to cultivated plants. The Cartagena Protocol emphasises the case-by-case assessment 
and the need to generate information relevant to the receiving environment: “Risk assessment 
should be carried out on a case-by-case basis. The required information may vary in nature and 
level of detail from case to case, depending on the living modified organism concerned, its 
intended use and the likely potential receiving environment” (Annex III). Thus, the Philippines 
should be cautious in using environmental and food safety data from India in place of its own 
testing. The topics I have chosen to write about are within my area of expertise. This document 
was prepared with the purpose of assisting the regulatory process conducted by the Philippines.  
 
Table 2: International consensus on the need for risk assessment 
“Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate:  
Establish or maintain means to regulate, manage or control the risks 
associated with the use and release of living modified organisms 
resulting from biotechnology which are likely to have adverse 
environmental impacts that could affect the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity, taking also into account the risks to human 
health”. 
Article 8. Convention on 
Biological Diversity  
The goal of each safety assessment is to provide assurance, in the light of 
the best available scientific knowledge, that the food will not cause harm 
when prepared or consumed according to its intended use, nor should the 
organism itself cause harm when viable organisms remain in the food. 
Codex (paragraph 25) 
In accordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 
of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the objective 
of this Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of 
protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living 
modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have 
adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, and specifically 
focusing on transboundary movements. 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
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1. Insertions 
A proper safety assessment includes a molecular (genomic) level profile of the modified plant. The 
purpose of this stage of the assessment is to ensure that all intended and unintended effects of the 
process are detected and evaluated, including changes in expression of endogenous genes and new 
gene products (at the RNA and protein levels). This is consistent with Codex recommendations 
(paragraph 31): 
 
“Information should be provided on the DNA insertions into the plant genome; this should 
include:  
A) the characterization and description of the inserted genetic materials;  
B) the number of insertion sites;  
C) the organisation of the inserted genetic material at each insertion site including copy number 
and sequence data of the inserted material and of the surrounding region, sufficient to identify any 
substances expressed as a consequence of the inserted material, or, where more appropriate, other 
information such as analysis of transcripts or expression products to identify any new substances 
that may be present in the food; and  
D) identification of any open reading frames within the inserted DNA or created by the insertions 
with contiguous plant genomic DNA including those that could result in fusion proteins.” 
 
However, for the Bt brinjal, Mahyco has not eliminated the possibility that there is more than one 
insertion of recombinant DNA and that all insertions are not free of vector “backbone” DNA. The 
following are reasons why one cannot conclude from Mahyco’s data that there is a single insert 
and no additional inserts of unexpected size or sequence composition. 
 
A. The Southern blot analysis is fundamentally flawed and incapable of finding unexpected 
inserts. 
a. The probe is described as “cry1Ac probe” or “Bt” probe (p. M34)3, apparently 
meaning the cry1Ac transgene and the probe was presumably appropriately 
                                                 
3 Page numbers beginning with “M” are from the document called Toxicology and allergenicity studies vol. 
1. 
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sequence modified to reflect changes introduced by the developers4. ECII also 
refers to a single probe called “Bt” in section 3.1.4. Since the probe is specific to 
only this part of pMON10518 (the plasmid used in the construction of EE-1), the 
blot is inappropriate for establishing that there are no other inserts and no 
backbone DNA from pMON10518. This is the scientific equivalent of using a 
microscope to track asteroids. 
 
Subsequently GEAC asserted that Mahyco had used “the entire pMON10518 
plasmid as a probe, as well as the nptII gene and 7S terminator-right border 
regions as probes. No additional bands were detected using these probes, 
indicating that there are no additional fragments from the construct at other 
locations in the genome.” However, I could not find these data either in the 
materials released in 2008 or in late 2009. In addition, the GEAC summary does 
not address the important point that there are no sensitivity parameters upon 
which to build confidence that any unintended insertions would be detected (see 
below). The conclusions of GEAC on this point are based on the strength of a 
negative result (non-detection), which could have multiple causes besides the 
absence of additional inserts. 
 
b. As recommended by Codex, Mahyco should disclose all details that are necessary 
to establish the sensitivity of their analyses. Therefore, the size of the probe and 
the stringency of the wash procedure should be reported. All probes should be 
shown on the plasmid map. Partial fragments of transgenes or genomic DNA 
interspersed into transgenes have been detected as fragments as small as 300 bp5. 
Mahyco would have to show that all its probes would have detected such small 
insertions at the sensitivity of 0.5 copies per diploid genome in order to establish 
with reasonable certainty that the negative result was meaningful. 
 
It is impossible to determine from the documents provided the sensitivity of the 
methods used by Mahyco to attempt to detect unintended additional inserts. 
 
                                                 
4 “Both regions of the cry1Ac gene were genetically modified for increased plant expression using a strategy 
comparable to that described by Perlak…” (p. 33). 
5 
https://bat.genok.org/bat/?sp=html/practical_assessment/ch2_DNA_to_insert/molecular_characterization/so
uthern_blots.html 
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Note that Codex  (paragraph 20) makes specific recommendations on molecular 
characterization:  
“The sensitivity of all analytical methods should be documented.” 
 
c. The sensitivity of genomic profiling methods (e.g. Southern blotting) for 
surveying insertions of partial transgenes should be at least to the standard of 
published studies6. These other published studies found that even to their much 
higher standard, they failed to detect all insertions initially. They found for 
example that “[t]ransgenic oat line 3830…was previously characterized with 
FISH, fiber-FISH, and Southern analyses and shown to have a single major 
transgene locus estimated to be ca. 15 kb in length. However, when T1 progeny of 
line 3830 were analyzed by Southern blot hybridizations with longer exposure 
times and more genomic DNA per lane compared to these previous analyses, two 
additional minor transgene loci were detected” (p. 424-425 Makarevitch et al. 
2003). Their work emphasizes how vulnerable analyses are to arbitrary exposure 
times, probe sizes and wash stringency. 
 
d. The PCR data does not substitute for the required Southern data because small 
fragments cannot be expected to insert in the correct order or proximity to primers 
for easy amplification7. 
 
e. The Southern blot provided as evidence (p. M46) is below acceptable standard for 
other reasons as well. A light band of the same size can be seen in control lanes 
and in the lanes with DNA taken from transgenic plants. This result can arise from 
sloppy handling and loading of samples. It can also result from contamination of 
control lines, and thus the use of controls that are also GM plants (see section 4 on  
comparators, below). Since we do not know the sensitivity of the probes, the 
possibility that the control lines carry a single simple insert cannot be ruled out 
with this data. In addition, larger bands are seen to hybridize and these could have 
secondary inserts to which the probe binds. The only way to resolve these 
possibilities is to clone and sequence all visible bands. 
 
f. Mahyco should meet the dual standard of demonstrating comprehensive coverage 
in their search for pMON10518 DNA (which the list of probes does not) and 
demonstrating appropriate sensitivity to small inserts (which the data do not). 
                                                 
6 https://bat.genok.org/bat/?sp=html/practical_assessment/ch2_DNA_to_insert/example.html 
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B. Mahyco previously argued incorrectly that there could be no vector sequences transferred 
and did not to my knowledge provide any evidence of having verified their assumption. 
GEAC never addressed this criticism. 
 
The claim by Mahyco was that during Ti plasmid-mediated DNA transfer from 
Agrobacterium tumefaciens to plants, only the T-DNA is transferred. These claims begin 
on page M32 (section 3.3). This view is clearly wrong. First, the expectation is 
inconsistent with the biochemical process (Waters and Guiney, 1993). Second, at least 
since the mid-1990s it has been known that the “long transfer – the collinear transfer of 
DNA past the traditional left border – is a common phenomenon” (p. 914 Wenck et al. 
1997). 
 
It is in fact surprising that in 2008 anyone would claim by argument alone that Ti-
mediated DNA transfer was precisely and routinely limited to the material between the left 
and right borders, given the extensive studies over 10 years prior showing the opposite. 
For example: “In this study, we report the surprising result that approximately 75% of the 
transgenic plants that we generated using Agrobacterium-mediated T-DNA transfer 
contained binary vector 'backbone' sequences integrated into the plant genome. We 
obtained these data using both DNA blot and PCR analyses of the DNA of these 
transgenic plants” (p. 951 Kononov et al. 1997, emphasis added). 
 
Outdated views such as those expressed by Mahyco derive from previous experiments that 
were not designed to detect backbone transfers. “Usually, transfer of only the non-T-DNA 
sequences to the plant would remain undetected because: (1) there is no selection for the 
transfer of such sequences; and (2) scientists generally have not looked for the transfer of 
these sequences” (p. 954 Kononov et al. 1997, emphasis added). Mahyco continues this 
tradition. The amount of DNA that can transfer can be many times the length of the T-
DNA region: “extremely long regions of DNA (greater than 200 kbp) can transfer to and 
                                                                                                                                                   
7 https://bat.genok.org/bat/?sp=html/practical_assessment/ch2_DNA_to_insert/example.html 
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integrate into the genome of plants” (p. 954 Kononov et al. 1997, emphasis added). More 
troubling, short backbone sequences can transfer and be difficult to detect. “In many 
instances, vector 'backbone' regions of a binary vector are smaller than what is 
conventionally termed the 'T-DNA' region” (p. 954 Kononov et al. 1997, emphasis added). 
 
These scientific facts invalidate additional claims made by Mahyco, notably that “[t]he 
border sequence itself is not entirely transferred during the T-DNA insertion in the plant 
genome. This means that the inserted DNA is no longer functional T-DNA, i.e., once 
integrated into the plant genomic DNA, it can not be remobilized into the genome of 
another plant even if acted upon by vir genes again” (p. M32). Note that Mahyco has 
rested its understanding of the T-DNA transfer process on highly selective references that 
are 1992 or older, and has reached erroneous conclusions. 
 
Mahyco also makes the claim that the disarmed Ti plasmid “does not transfer to the plant 
cells but remains in the Agrobacterium” (p. M32). The Ti plasmid is a conjugative 
plasmid. It has been known since the 1980s that conjugative plasmids transfer to 
eukaryotes including plants. At some frequency, the Ti plasmid itself may transfer to the 
plants (Buchanan-Wollaston et al., 1987, Ferguson and Heinemann, 2002, Heinemann, 
1991). It is Mahyco’s burden to demonstrate with proper molecular analyses that this did 
not happen. No data are presented by Mahyco to establish the absence of Ti DNA, and this 
was never denied by GEAC. 
 
Finally, there is no indication of a left border on the pMON10518 map (p. M40) or on the 
list of genetic elements (Table 3.2, p. M48). If the left border is indeed missing, then the 
entire plasmid will transfer. 
 
The Philippines should be aware of these facts and should, in my view, require the 
company to properly demonstrate that no unintended additional inserts exist.  
 
In its review of the molecular characterization (ECII section III), GEAC failed to indicate 
that it was aware of the deficiencies in Mahyco’s experiments, and committed its own 
errors of logic. For example, GEAC asserted that: “Agrobacterium-mediated 
transformation has been used for the development of numerous biotech crops grown 
around the world for the past two decades, and has a proven track (sic) from a biosafety 
standpoint.” 
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GEAC was wrong to associate its views on the safety of some commercialized products 
with the conclusion that the method of development has a history of safe use. Furthermore, 
such sweeping generalizations violate international consensus advice that assessments 
should be “case-by-case”. While these products are considered safe by competent 
authorities in some countries based on both a pre-market assessment and their use in 
structured agricultural systems, other countries have reached different conclusions, at least 
for environmental assessments. There are a limited number of commercialized products 
derived from Agrobacterium-mediated transformation. The number of products being used 
is still very small and does not warrant an endorsement of the safety of a particular 
procedure. For example, considering the number and the kinds of products based on 
nuclear fission (from bombs to power plants) it could be asserted that in the context in 
which products of nuclear fission are deployed these products have a safe track record. 
This does not mean that every nuclear fission reaction is inherently safe and by extension 
every bomb or powerplant in every context is inherently safe just because it is based on 
nuclear fission.  
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2. Novel cry gene has no natural analogue or history of safe use 
The GEAC claimed in its ECII report (p. 11) that: “The cry1Ac protein produced in Bt brinjal is 
similar in structure and activity to that found in nature and in commercial B.t.k. microbial 
formulations.” This is inaccurate (see below).  
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The cry1Ac gene was in fact a chimeric formed by fusing selected parts of two cry genes found in 
nature (p. M32). Moreover, these parts are not identical to the parts found in nature, with the 
potentially significant substitution of a serine for a natural leucine at position 766 and other 
unspecified changes to increase “insecticidal efficacy” (p. M33). Serine is an amino acid that is 
frequently modified through linkages to sugar residues in-planta after protein production, thus 
making inexcusable the absence of analyses on post-translational modifications (see section 3, 
below). 
 
Mahyco go on to claim that the part of the protein with the newly introduced serine will be of no 
consequence because this portion of the protein is removed when the pro-toxin is activated through 
protease cleavage in the insect gut (“Since the Cry1Ac protein produced in the Bt brinjal yields an 
insecticidally active trypsin resistant core product of approximately 600 amino acids in size, the 
amino acid at position 766 will be lost in the insecticidally inactive fragment upon exposure to 
trypsin (or the proteases within the insect gut…” p. M33). This claim is misleading. The entire 
pro-toxin is produced in the plant. People and wildlife will be exposed to the pro-toxin and all its 
subsequent modifications when they eat the plant. Its cleavage in the insect gut has no relevance to 
food safety or for assessing non-target effects. 
 
There are no direct scientific data that support the Indian regulator’s claim that the gene used in Bt 
brinjal is structurally or functionally equivalent to that found in commercial B.t.k. microbial 
formulations. 
 
3. Expression: Novel RNA and Proteins 
Mayhco did not provide information on potential novel RNAs and proteins produced in the six 
possible open reading frames created by the EE-I event or by undetected secondary insertions. In 
fact, Mahyco has provided no information whatsoever on novel RNAs. This is a significant 
omission. Moreover, since Mahyco uses the nos3′ terminator in its construct it has an added 
obligation to look for novel RNAs. The nos3′ is not an efficient terminator in eukaryotes, leading 
to read-through, longer mRNA molecules and potential fusion proteins. 
 
According to Codex (paragraph 32): 
“Information should be provided on any expressed substances in the recombinant-DNA plant; this 
should include: the gene product(s) (e.g. a protein or an untranslated RNA); the gene product(s)’ 
function…”. 
 
GEAC has commented that “the insertion sites from Bt brinjal event EE-1 was isolated and 
sequenced. The 3′ end of the cry1Ac gene was examined and found to have the expected stop 
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codon, followed by the 7S terminator and right border. Genomic flanking sequence examined on 
either side of the insertion showed no significant matches [to] any sequence in GenBank, and 
does not encode any open reading frames in all six frames. This suggests that no novel RNAs or 
proteins were generated as a result of the EE-1 insertion.” 
 
A. The GEAC response is based on assumption, not evidence. Moreover, the assumptions are 
not reliable. 
 
a. These sequences at the end of a gene do not stop transcription initiation 5′ of 
themselves. Reference to a reading frame is not relevant, since Codex advises to 
find untranslated RNA too. 
 
b. The presence of stop codons and terminator sequences are not sufficient to prove 
the absence of unintended RNA and protein products.  
 
For example, Mahyco has used the nos3′ terminator adjacent to the nptII gene. The 
nos3′ is not an efficient terminator in eukaryotes, leading to read-through, longer 
mRNA molecules and potential fusion proteins (Rang et al., 2005). 
 
Researchers first reported this in a transgenic soybean called 40-3-2. Interestingly, 40-
3-2 is a Monsanto product and Monsanto is presumably the source of pMON10581. 
Even more troubling, “the read-through transcript [in 40-3-2] was processed in four 
different RNA-variants” (p. 440 Rang et al., 2005). The variants might arise from 
splicing pathways or other pathways that are not predicted from Genbank DNA 
sequences. 
 
A significant concern raised by the authors about the variant RNA molecules in 40-3-
2, if they arise through a splicing mechanism, was that the nos sequence itself harbors 
a splice site. “The cis regulatory regions that initiate and mediate splicing are located 
within the removed region of spliced transcripts. If this is also true for the mechanisms 
mediating posttranscriptional processing of the described variants, it seems reasonable 
to assume that the transcribed nos terminator region might be responsible for 
processing the RNA. Since the nos terminator was and still is commonly used as 
regulatory region in the production of genetically modified crops, read-through 
products and RNA variants could also be expressed in these plants” (p. 442 Rang et 
al., 2005, emphasis added). Since nos is also used in Bt binjal, these established 
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research findings require that it be evaluated for variant RNA species arising from the 
inserted DNA.  
 
This research has been extended to other genetically engineered plants (Box 1). 
 
Box 1. General problems with nos3′ termination. 
The experiments showed the synthesis, due to the known loss of the NOS terminator, 
of fusion RNA variants coding for putative CRY fusion protein showing 2 or 18 
putative additional amino acids, composed of the 3′ end of truncated cry1A(b) gene 
and the putative HECT 3′ sequences transcribed in antisense orientation. Different 
transcripts showed a series of deletions some of which in common to all observed 
RNAs…In silico translation of putative fusion RNAs did not show significant 
identities with known protein domains…Taken together, our data, while suggesting 
the insertion of the transgenic sequence in a putative HECT gene, show the 
transcription of new fusion RNAs, a result similar to that obtained by Rang and et al. 
(2005) in Roundup Ready Soybean 40-3-2 (p. 280 Rosati, A. et al., 2008, emphasis 
added). 
  
Note that these novel variants (Rang et al. and Box 1) were not predicted from 
Genbank analyses of open reading frames. This is emerging as a general theme in 
molecular biology and cannot be ignored by the industry or the regulator. In addition 
to transcriptome changes, there are unpredicted changes in the proteome. For example, 
see Box 2. 
 
Box 2. Testing to detect unintended changes in the proteome. 
A comparison of a commercial maize variety carrying the MON810 event [from 
Monsanto] and its isogenic relatives (Zolla, L. et al., 2008) indicates both that 
unanticipated changes occur as a result of the engineering process and that these can 
be more carefully characterized using profiling techniques that are not common in the 
scientific dossiers provided to regulators (Heinemann, J.A., 2007). 
 
The commercial line (33P67) was confirmed by Southern blotting to have a single 
insert (Zolla, L. et al., 2008). The subsequent analysis was on the proteome, 
comparing seeds of the commercial line and the seeds of its immediate F1 generation 
(33P67F1) with the seeds of the isogenic comparator (33P66) and the seeds of its 
immediate F1 generation (33P66F1). These comparisons allowed the researchers to 
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measure variability in the proteome that was caused by the environment (33P66 vs. 
33P66F1 and 33P67 vs. 33P67F1), effects caused only by the engineering process 
(33P66F1 vs. 33P67F1), and the combined effects of environment and engineering 
(33P66 vs. 33P67). 
 
Approximately 100 of the identifiable proteins varied either quantitatively (increases 
or decreases but protein in both) or qualitatively (protein present only in one) in the 
comparison of the seeds from the conventional line and the seeds it produced 
(33P66F1). Similar numbers of statistically significant changes were observed in the 
seeds of the transgenic 33P67 and its F1 progeny (78 changes). This is the effect of 
breeding and the environment on proteome changes because the tested seeds (33P66 
and 33P67) came from plants grown in different environments. Comparisons between 
33P66 and 33P67 reveal the combination of differences in environment and effects of 
the genetic engineering process. There were 27 statistically significant proteome 
differences between the conventional and transgenic seeds.  
 
This illustrates that only thorough scientific testing, and not assumption-based 
reasoning of the kind used in the ECII, can properly be used for risk assessment. 
 
References8 
Heinemann, J.A. (2007). Letter to the Editor. Environ Plann Law J 24, 157-160.  
Zolla, L., Rinalducci, S., Antonioli, P. & Righetti, P. G. (2008). Proteomics as a 
complementary tool for identifying unintended side effects occurring in transgenic 
maize seeds as a result of genetic modifications. J Proteome Res 7, 1850-61.   
 
Regardless of whether the variant RNAs arise from a cryptic splice site within nos or 
through other processing pathways, all novel RNA species in Bt binjal must be 
reported for a proper safety assessment. I encourage the Philippines to adhere to the 
full extend of Codex guidelines, and avoid picking and choosing which standards to 
enforce and which to excuse. 
 
References 
Codex, (2003). Guidelines for the conduct of food safety assessment of foods derived from 
recombinant DNA plants. CAC/GL 45-2003. 
                                                 
8 
https://bat.genok.org/bat/?sp=html/practical_assessment/ch2_DNA_to_insert/breeding_trees_equivalence.ht
ml 
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Rang, A., Linke, B. & Jansen, B. (2005). Detection of RNA variants transcribedfrom the transgene 
in Roundup Ready soybean. Eur. Food Res. Technol. 220, 438–443. 
Rosati, A., Bogani, P., Santarlasci, A. & Buiatti, M. (2008). Characterisation of 3' transgene 
insertion site and derived mRNAs in MON810 YieldGard maize. Plant Mol. Biol. 67, 271-81. 
 
c. The failure to adequately assess the kinds of novel RNAs produced at the site of 
insertion is compounded by the very real possibility that there exist additional 
uncharacterized unintended insertions, each of which could be responsible for 
generating unknown and unintended novel RNA and proteins. Two kinds of 
experiments would put this question to rest: 
i. proper and full profiling of the genome by a combination of techniques 
(done properly, as discussed above); and 
ii. transcriptome9, proteome and metabolome10 profiling: 
“Non-targeted, analytical approaches at the gene, transcript, protein and 
metabolite levels are the methods-of-choice for investigating the 
physiology of the GM plants as comprehensively as possible, thus 
increasing the chances of detecting unintended effects” (p. 103 Rischer et 
al. 2006). 
 
Disappointingly, GEAC (ECII) dismissed Dr. P.M. Bhargava’s previous 
recommendation for profiling for the following reasons: 
• the techniques are expensive and have “little value”; and 
• they are not validated. 
 
These assertions are not based on evidence and are not in my opinion—
and that of other biosafety experts—correct11. In fact, even Mahyco’s 
collaborator, Monsanto, has demonstrated its ability to perform such 
profiling (Box 3). 
 
                                                 
9 
https://bat.genok.org/bat/?sp=html/topic_guides/ch1_basics/profiling_hazards/molecular_methods/transcript
ome_techniques/main.html 
10 
https://bat.genok.org/bat/?sp=html/topic_guides/ch1_basics/profiling_hazards/molecular_methods/proteome
_techniques/main.html 
11 see quote above by Rischer et al. and 
https://bat.genok.org/bat/?sp=html/topic_guides/ch1_basics/profiling_hazards/main.html 
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Box 3. Industry use of profiling. 
Transcriptome 
Monsanto researchers conducted a survey of small RNAs found in 
soybean seeds, corn kernels, and rice grains (Ivashuta, S.I. et al., 2008). 
Although this survey was incomplete, it represents the largest such 
survey that I am aware of to date. These RNAs were ≤30 nucleotides 
long. The RNA molecules isolated from rice were sequenced using high 
throughput 454 procedures, for a total of 285,864 unique and sequenced 
RNA molecules.  
 
The researchers were able to quantify the amount of RNA in size range 
of ≤30 nucleotides for mature soybean and corn seeds. Soybean had 
approximately 0.70 g of small RNA/gram of tissue, and corn and rice 
reportedly had similar amounts.  
 
This study demonstrates that it is within the capacity of developers to 
perform profiling experiments for the purpose of hazard identification. 
The number of small RNAs reported in this study would likely exceed 
the number of anticipated and unintended small RNAs generated as a 
result of the engineering process and insertions, and thus the exercise 
would be even simpler when applied to the GMO.  
 
References: Monsanto study published under Ivashuta, S.I., Petrick, J.S., 
Heisel, S.E., Zhang, Y., Guo, L., Reynolds, T. L., Rice, J.F., Allen, E. & 
Roberts, J.K. (2009). Endogenous small RNAs in grain: semi-
quantification and sequence homology to human and animal genes. Food 
Chem Toxicol 47:353-360. 
 
Proteome  
This study demonstrated that 2DE [2D gel electrophoresis] can be 
utilized to reliably analyze the seed proteome of transgenic A. thaliana 
(p. 2176). 
Quote from a Monsanto publication under Ruebelt, M. C., Lipp, M., 
Reynolds, T. L., Schmuke, J. J., Astwood, J. D., DellaPenna, D., Engel, 
K. H. & Jany, K. D. (2006). Application of two-dimensional gel 
electrophoresis to interrogate alterations in the proteome of gentically 
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modified crops. 3. Assessing unintended effects. J. Agric. Food Chem. 
54, 2169-2177.  
 
“[T]his method [2D gel electrophoresis] could be used to interrogate 
proteome alterations such as a novel protein, fusion protein, or any other 
change that affects molecular mass, isoelectric point, and/or quantity of a 
protein” (p. 2154). 
Quote from a Monsanto study published under Ruebelt, M. C., 
Leimgruber, N. K., Lipp, M., Reynolds, T. L., Nemeth, M. A., Astwood, 
J. D., Engel, K. H. & Jany, K. D. (2006). Application of two-dimensional 
gel electrophoresis to interrogate alterations in the proteome of 
genetically modified crops. 1. Assessing analytical validation. J. Agric. 
Food Chem. 54, 2154-2161. 
 
GEAC and all other regulators do accept profiling evidence. Southern 
blotting (done properly) to determine if unintended additional insertions 
were made during transformation is a profiling of the genome. This 
procedure has not been “validated”, but is ubiquitously accepted 
(Heinemann, 2007). 
 
References 
Heinemann, J.A. (2007). Letter to the Editor. Environ Plann Law J 24, 157-160. 
Rischer, H. & Oksman-Caldentey, K.-M. (2006). Unintended effects in genetically modified 
crops: revealed by metabolomics? Trends Biotechnol. 24, 102-104. 
 
4. Comparator12 
All scientific studies that form part of a safety evaluation must involve a comparator. The 
comparator must be appropriate and used consistently. The purpose of the comparator is to 
provide the standard baseline for all measurements, and be the single common element in all 
experiments using material grown in multiple locations and years. It is impossible to determine if 
either of these rules were followed in the dossier for Bt brinjal.  
 
The Philippines should be aware that failure to adhere to these simple scientific rules has resulted 
in withdrawal of other commercial products. Monsanto’s dossier for LY038 and LY038 x 
MON810, two GM corn varieties, also failed to follow these rules. Despite LY038 being 
                                                 
12 https://bat.genok.org/bat/?sp=html/topic_guides/ch2_dna_to_insert/breeding_trees.html 
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approved by several jurisdictions, both Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) and the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) required Monsanto to redo crucial experiments because 
Monsanto did not use the proper comparator. While some revised experiments were submitted to 
FSANZ and LY038 was ultimately approved by them, in early 2009 EFSA required other 
experiments to be redone. Despite an estimated US$1 billion investment in LY038 and its 
derivatives’ marketing, processing and development, Monsanto instead chose to withdraw the 
product from further evaluation by EFSA and discontinued all plans for commercial production. 
This story illustrates the critical importance of the comparator to all the scientific findings. 
Getting this wrong can kill the product in other jurisdictions and for good reason: using different 
and/or inappropriate comparators in the many different experiments takes away the ability to 
identify true hazards and assess them. 
 
The comparator is defined by Codex (footnote 5) as the conventional counterpart derived from the 
non-GM parent, and cannot be a product of modern biotechnology: 
“[It] is recognized that for the foreseeable future, foods derived from modern biotechnology will 
not be used as conventional counterparts.” 
 
EFSA (2008 p. S9) requires that: 
“The appropriate comparators have all traits in common except for the newly introduced ones.” 
 
And EFSA (2006, p. 22-23): 
“In the case of vegetatively propagated crops, comparative analyses should include the non-
genetically modified isogenic variety used to generate the transgenic lines. In the case of crops 
that reproduce sexually, comparators would include appropriate information required in 
applications for GM plants and/or derived food and feed non-GM lines of comparable genetic 
background.” 
 
While Codex and EFSA do not preclude the use of control lines in addition to the proper 
comparator, these additional lines should not substitute for the comparator. 
 
What was the comparator for Bt brinjal? Was it the non-GM parent, closely related (e.g. ≥50%)? 
Was a single comparator consistently used in all molecular, toxicological, immunological, feeding 
and compositional studies? I could find little or no information on the comparator in any 
experiment that I reviewed. The GEAC report (ECII) mentions the comparator zero times. GEAC 
does mention the “conventional counterpart”, but does not indicate that this was a single closely 
related parent used consistently in all experiments, nor does GEAC provide any details on the 
genotype or history of this conventional counterpart. Hence, I have low confidence that the 
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simple, but critical, scientific practice of using the same and the appropriate comparator has been 
followed. 
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EFSA, (2006). Guidance Document of the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms 
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Conclusion/Summary 
In my opinion, the dossier and the subsequent GEAC analysis (ECII) fail to meet fundamental 
and even routine hazard assessment standards for molecular characterization. 
• I advise against any substitution of Philippine-generated data with that provided by 
Mahyco because the data used by India: 
o is not customized to the consumption patterns and local food of the Philippines 
and the biodiversity of the Philippines; and  
o was fundamentally flawed (in the ways described above). 
• The molecular characterization of event EE-1 was incapable of detecting additional 
inserts which have a high likelihood of existing based on the methods used. 
• There were no satisfactory descriptions of changes to the genome, and hence I have no 
confidence in the conclusion that unintended additional gene products (e.g. novel RNA 
and protein) are not made. All unintended gene products should be described and 
evaluated as potential hazards in human food or to non-target wildlife and 
microorganisms. 
• There were no satisfactory descriptions of changes to the proteome, including isoforms of 
the intended protein. 
• Critical scientific details are systematically lacking, including those necessary to evaluate 
experimental design (e.g., controls, particularly the isogenic comparator) and method 
sensitivity. 
 
Since molecular characterization is the starting point of all risk assessments of genetically 
modified organisms, the downstream effects of a poor molecular characterization on the overall 
assessment of risk can be significant. If indeed Bt brinjal is safe for human consumption, safe for 
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environmental release, and the right technology for the Philippines, then the certainty of this can 
be demonstrated using existing, affordable and effective scientific analyses. 
 
I urge the Philippines to insist on the proper standards being met to ensure that the product 
matches the claims. The Philippines should also insist upon its own in-country testing of any 
similar Bt brinjal product, and culture-specific testing of cooked/processed foods that include a 
brinjal ingredient. A checklist of tests is provided by the Biosafety Assessment Tool 
(https://bat.genok.org/bat/) which is freely available to all. This checklist allows a careful 
regulator to confirm that the science has been done to high and appropriate standards and that the 
guidelines set by Codex and other competent food and environment safety agencies have been 
fully addressed by the data.  
  
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
Prof. Jack Heinemann 
1 September 2010 
